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ESTABLISHING FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 

LAW JUDGES AS AN INDEPENDENT 







At the annual banquet of the Federal Administrative Law 
Judges Conference on May 14, 1983, Senator Howell Heftin an­
nounced that two days earlier he had introduced a bill to establish 
administrative law judges as an independent, unified corps. The 
Senator discussed the importance of the administrative judiciary and 
the need for its functions to be performed in an independent atmos­
phere, free of bias, in order to assure fairness and give credence to its 
decisions. Senator Heftin stressed that "these judicial officers must 
be free from any association or personal obligation to any party or 
agency in order that every litigant to the process be afforded fairness 
and due process. The mere appearance of bias and prejudice smacks 
at the vital concept of fairness and due process."· 
• Administrative Law Judge, U. S. Depanment of Agriculture, from 1975 to pres­
ent. B.A., and J.D., Columbia University. Member of Maryland, District of Columbia, 
and the United States Supreme Court Bars. Prior to joining the Depanment of Agricul­
ture, engaged in private practice specializing in litigation and administrative law. Chair­
man of The Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference's "Committee on the 
Corps," and an officer of the American Bar Association's National Conference of Ad­
ministrative Law Judges, Judicial Administration Division. Testified regarding Senate 
Bill 1275 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administra­
tive Practice and Procedure, on June 23, 1983. 
•• B.A., University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., Columbia University School of Law. 
Member of the New York, Maryland, District of Columbia, and United States Supreme 
Court Bars. Member of the United States Army, Europe Board of Contract Appeals 
from 1968-1972. Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor from 
1973-1979, Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission from 1979 to 1981, and 
United States Postal Service from 1981 to present. President of The Federal Administra­
tive Law Judges Conference since June 1983. Liaison Representative to the Administra­
tive Conference of the United States since June 1983. Testified regarding Senate Bill 
1275 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure, on June 23, 1983. 
1. Address of Senator Heflin, Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference An· 
nual Banquet in Washington, D.C. (May 14, 1983). See also 129 CONO. REc. S6610-11 
(daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin). "Agency" as used by Senator Heflin 
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Senator Heflin noted that the use of similar systems in several 
States had resulted in substantial savings and efficiencies that he ex­
pected the federal government would experience once his bill, Senate 
bill 12752 was enacted.3 
This article will describe the status of administrative law judges 
in the federal government; analyze Senate bill 1275; review the testi­
mony before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Pro­
cedure, Senate Judiciary Committee; and evaluate the arguments in 
support of and in opposition to Senator Hefiin's bill. 




There are 1,134 administrative law judges serving in the federal 
government today.4 They hear and decide cases that "permeate 
every sphere and almost every activity of our national life [and] have 
a profound effect upon the direction of our economic growth."s 
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis estimates that the use of admin­
istrative judges began in 1789 with the appointment of officers to 
determine which soldiers were "disabled during the late war" and 
customs officers who were authorized to "estimate the duties paya­
ble" on imports.6 
But 1946 is the true year of birth for today's federal administra­
tive law judge. That is the year the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) was enacted.7 
Under the APA, administrative law judges presently hold career 
appointments pursuant to a system of merit selection.8 They are the 
only government officers, apart from certain agency heads or officials 
who are provided for specially under other specific statutes, who 
may conduct rulemaking and adjudicative hearings when agency ac­
and by the authors, includes executive departments. This is consistent with the definition 
of "agency" in the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1982). 
2. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
3. 129 CONGo REC. S6610 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin). 
4. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, TOTAL NUMBER OF AUs ON BOARD BY 
GRADE AND AGENCY AS OF NOVEMBER 21, 1983. 
5. Message of President John F. Kennedy, H.R. Doc. No. 135, 57th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1-2 (1961), quoted in Macy, The APA 0IId the HelUing Examiner: Products of a 
Viable Political Society, 27 FED. B.J. 351, 353 (1967). 
6. 3 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.11, at 313 (2d ed. 1978). 
7. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at 5 
U.S.c. §§ 551-559,701-706,1305,3105,3344,6362,7562 (1982». 
8. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGE HEARINGS STATUS REPORT FOR 1976-1978, at 9-13 (1980). 
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tion is based on substantial evidence of record. Their functions have 
been held to be "functionally comparable"9 to those of trial judges 
which entitles them to absolute immunity from liability arising out 
of their judicial acts. IO 
The AP A was enacted in response to charges that "the practice 
of creating independent regulatory commissions, who perform ad­
ministrative work in addition to judicial work, threatens to develop a 
'fourth branch' of the Government for which there is no sanction in 
the Constitution." II 
The change in the status of administrative law judgesl2 effectu­
ated by the APA, was first reviewed by the Supreme Court in Ram­
speck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference .13 In that case the 
Supreme Court traced the history of these Article I officers and the 
9. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). 
10. Id. at 516. 
II. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIs­
TORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1946, at 189 (1946). 
12. In 1978, the APA was amended to substitute the title "Administrative Law 
Judge" for the earlier designation "Hearing Examiner." Act of March 27, 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-251, §§ 2. 3. 92 Stat. 183. 183-84. 
13. 345 U.S. 128 (1953). 

Prior to the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, hearing examiners' 

tenure and status were governed by the Classification Act of 1923, as amended. 

Under the Classification Act, as employees of an agency. their classification was 
determined by the ratings given them by the agency, and their compensation 
and promotion depended upon their classification. The examiners were in a 
dependent status. 
With the rapid growth of administrative law [their) role ...became in­
creasingly significant and controversial. . . . 
Many complaints were voiced against the actions of the hearing examiners. 
it being charged that they were mere tools of the agency concerned and sub­
servient to the agency heads in making their proposed findings of fact and rec­
ommendations. A study by President Roosevelt·s Committee on 
Administrative Management resulted in a report in 1937 recommending separa­
tion ofadjudicatory functions and personnel from investigative and prosecution 
personnel in the agencies. The Attorney General's Committee on Administra­
tive Procedure was appointed in 1939 to study the decisional process in admin­
istrative agencies. and the final report of this Committee was published in 1941. 
Both the majority and minority members of the Committee recommended that 
hearing examiners be made partially independent of the agency by which they 
were employed; the majority recommended hearing examiners be appointed for 
a term of seven years and the minority recommended a term of twelve years. 
Although extensive hearings were held on bills to carry out the recommenda­
tions of this Committee. World War II delayed final congressional action on 
this subject. After the war, the McCarron-Sumners Bill, which became the Ad­
ministrative Procedure Act, was introduced. The Senate Judiciary Print ofJune 
1945 reveals that at that time there was still great diversity of opinion as to how 
the status of hearing examiners should be enhanced. Several proposals were 
considered, and in the final bill Congress provided that hearing examiners 
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controversial nature of their positions. The APA's legislative history 
demonstrates that there had been much stronger support for the cre­
ation of a fully, independent administrative judiciary than that indi­
cated by the majority opinion in Ramspeck .14 The final report of the 
Attorney General's Committee, for example, contains an express rec­
ommendation by the minority members for complete separation of 
the adjudicative function in cases involving agency prosecution of 
complaints against private parties: 
Hearing and deciding officers cannot be wholly independent so 
long as their appointments, assignments, personnel records, and 
reputations are subject to control by an authority which is also 
engaged in investigating and prosecuting. Of course, this depen­
dence may be diminished by various devices, as the Committee 
has very rightly attempted. We think it clear, however, that such 
dependents (sic) cannot be eliminated by measures short of com- . 
plete segregation into independent agencies. I S 
Concern over administrative impartiality antedating the 1946 
enactment of the APA had led to earlier congressional responses. In 
1939, Senator Norris introduced a bill to create a separate adminis­
trative court. 16 A succession of bills offering various remedies were 
introduced in Congress between 1933 and 1946;17 and, during the 
interim between the appointment of the Attorney General's Com­
mittee pursuant to the directions of President· Roosevelt, and the is­
suance of its formal report, Congress actually passed one of them­
the Walter-Logan bill. IS It was vetoed by President Roosevelt on 
December 18, 1940, and the veto was sustained by the House. When 
this event was later discussed by Justice Jackson in Wong Yang Sung 
v. McGralh,19 however, he concluded that though the President ve­
toed the bill, he recognized the need for reform.20 Justice Jackson 
should be given independence and tenure within the existing Civil Service 
system. 
Id. at 130-32. 
14. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS­
TORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1946, at 41-42 (1946). 
15. ATT'y GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE IN GOv'T AGENCIES, S. Doc. No.8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 203-09 (1941). 
16. S. 5154, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939). 
17. S. 1835, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); S. 3787, H.R. 1297, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1936); S. 3676, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); H.R. 6324, H.R. 4235, H.R. 4236, S. 915, S. 
916, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); S. 674, S. 675, S. 918, H.R. 3464, H.R. 4238, H.R. 4782, 
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. 1203, S. 7, 79th Cong., lst Sess. (1945). 
18. S. 915, H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). 
19. 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
20. Id. at 39. 
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said of the AP A itself: "The Act thus represents a long period of 
study and strife; it settles long-continued and hard-fought conten­
tions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political 
forces have come to rest. It contains many compromises and gener­
alities and, no doubt, some ambiguities. Experience may reveal 
defects. . . ."21 
The alternatives before Congress and the methodology selected 
to secure the independence of the administrative judiciary is de­
scribed in the legislative history of the APA, as follows: 
The purpose of this section is to render examiners independent 
and secure in their tenure and compensation. The section (section 
Uof the APA) thus takes a different ground than the present situa­
tion in which examiners are mere employees of an agency, and 
other proposals for a completely separate "examiners' pool" from 
which agencies might draw for hearing officers. Recognizing that 
the entire tradition of the Civil Service is directed toward security 
of tenure, it seems wise to put that tradition to use in the present 
case. However, additional powers are conferred upon the 
Commission.22 
When the Supreme Court, in Butz v. Economou 23 held adminis­
trative law judges to be "functionally comparable" to trial judges, it 
stressed that they resolve conflicts of an adversarial nature "every bit 
as fractious as those which come to court," and have comparable 
powers to issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the 
course of hearings, and make or recommend decisions.24 The opin­
ion went on to list the APA's provisions designed to guarantee the 
independence of administrative law judges: The Office of Personnel 
Management and the appointing agency-employer controls their 
pay; cases must be assigned to them in rotation so far as practicable; 
no party may consult with them exparte concerning a fact at issue in 
21. Id. at 40-41. 
Of the several administrative evils sought to be cured or minimized, only two 
are particularly relevant to issues before us today. One purpose was to intro­
duce greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of administrative 
practice among the diverse agencies whose customs had departed widely from 
each other .... 
More fundamental, however, was the purpose to curtail and change the 
practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and 
judge. 
Id. 
22. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Congo 2d Sess. (1937), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS­
TORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1946, at 215 (1946). 
23. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
24. Id. at 512-13. 
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a hearing; they may not be responsible to, supervised by, or directed 
by agency agents or personnel performing investigative or prosecu­
tion functions; they may not perform duties inconsistent with their 
duties as administrative law judges; and they may be removed only 
for good cause established and determined by the Merit System Pro­
tection Board after a hearing on the record.25 
But the insulation from agency pressures that the APA affords 
administrative law judges is far from complete. The Supreme Court 
in its earlier decision in Ramspeck, upheld the right of the Civil 
Service Commission26 to classify " the examiners into grades, with 
salaries appropriate to each grade, . . . in each federal agency using 
examiners. This classification ranged from just one grade in several 
agencies to five grades in two agencies."27 The majority conceded 
that the Commission had employed wholly subjective specifications 
when it classified the grades as "moderately difficult and important," 
"difficult and important," ''unusually difficult and important," "ex­
ceedingly difficult and important," and "exceptionally difficult and 
important."28 Nevertheless, the majority upheld this practice under 
which the employing "agency shall decide if there is a vacancy to be 
filled, and further that the agency shall decide if this vacancy is to be 
filled by promotion from among the present examiners."29 
The majority opinion next interpreted the APA's requirement 
that "examiners shall be assigned to cases in rotation sofar aspracti­
cable ."30 The majority believed that this did not require mechanical 
rotation, but permitted assignments to be made on the basis of "the 
experience and ability of the examiner available."31 
Finally, the majority held that an agency may dispense with the 
services of administrative law judges "for lack of funds, personnel 
ceilings, reorganizations, decrease of work and similar reasons" 
through "reductions-in-force," under which judges holding the low­
est number of "retention credits" may be removed from office "for 
good cause" within the meaning of the AP A.32 
Justice Black, with whom Justices Frankfurter and Douglas 
25. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d). 3105.7521 (1982). 
26. The Civil Service Commission was the predecessor of the Office of Personnel 
Management and the Merit Systems Protection board. 
27. Ramspeck. 345 U.S. at 135. 
28. Id. at 136-37. 
29. Id. at 138. 
30. Id. at 139 (emphasis in original). 
31. Id. at 139-40. 
32. Id. at 142-43. 
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concurred, vigorously disagreed with the Ramspeck majority 
opinion: 
I agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the 
regulations here sustained go a long way toward frustrating the 
purposes of Congress to give examiners independence. . . . The 
distinctions depended upon to support the different classifications 
are so nebulous that the head of an agency is left practically free 
to select any examiner he chooses for any case he chooses. . . . 
And administrative agencies are permitted to attribute choice of a 
particular examiner for a particular case to considerations whether 
"complex legal, economic, financial or technical questions or mat­
ters" are merely "moderately complex," "fairly complex," "ex­
tremely complex," "exceptionally complex," or just "complex." I 
think all these conceptualistic distinctions mean is that the con­
gressional command for a nonagency controlled rotation of cases 
is buried under words.33 
But, the Ramspeck majority is still the controlling interpretation 
of the actual parameters of protection from agency pressures that the 
APA provides to administrative law judges. Those who argue that 
the APA's protections are so all-embracing that there is no need to 
completely separate administrative law judges from their present 
agency employers, necessarily ignore Ramspeck. They ignore con­
cerns embodied in calls for the establishment of an administrative 
court by the recommendations of the Second Hoover Commission in 
1955,34 the Ash Council in 1971,3s and then Solicitor General Robert 
H. Bork in 1977.36 They also overlook the 1974 report of the La 
Macchia Committee which stopped short of recommending anew the 
formation of an administrative court and opted instead for the estab­
lishment of a "unified COrpS."37 
33. Id. at 144-45 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
34. Comm'n on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, 84th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Report to the Congress Vol. VI, at 84 (1955). The recommended court 
would have consisted.ofthree sections: Tax (which would involve transferring this func­
tion from the Executive to the Judicial Branch); Labor (replacing the NLRB); and Trade 
(replacing the FTC and certain other regulatory agencies). Hearing Examiners would 
have been replaced by Hearing Commissioners serving as the Court's trial division. Id. 
35. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 53 (1971). This proposed an administrative court having 
jurisdiction over appeals from transportation, securities, and power agencies. Id. 
36. DEP'T OF JUSTICE COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, 
THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1977). The Bork Committee proposed that non­
Article III tribunals be created which "could consist of an Article I trial division. . .and 
an administrative court of appeals. The trial division could serve the function now 
served by administrative law judges ...." Id. at 7-11. 
37. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE 
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It is this latter recommendation which the Heflin Bill would 
implement. 
III. THE HEFLIN BILL: ITS PURPOSE AND PROVISIONS 
The essential purpose of the Heflin bill is to remove administra­
tive law judges from the supervision and control of the agencies 
where they are presently employed, and establish them instead, as an 
independent, unified COrpS.38 
The Corps would initially be divided into seven divisions in 
keeping with present, major specialties of administrative law.39 
Each division would be headed by a division chief judge required by 
the bill to be an expert in the division's field of adjudication, demon­
strated by having at least five years of experience as an administra­
tive law judge assigned to cases of the type to be handled by the 
division.40 The division chiefs, together with the chief judge of the 
STUDY OF THE UTILIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (LAMACCHIA COMM'N 
REpORT) 46 (1974). 
38. 129 CONGo REC. S6609-l0 (daily ed. May 12, 1983) (statement of Sen. Heflin). 
39. S. 1275, 98th Congo 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 564(b». These divisions would be organized in the following manner: 
1. Division of Communication, Puhlic Utility and Transportation Regulation 
Federal Communications Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commis­
sion, Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Mar­
itime Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
2. Division ofHealtlr, Safety and Environmental Regulation 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Review Commission, National Transportation Safety Board, Environ­
mental Protection Agency, Department of the Interior, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, Coast Guard. 
3. Division ofLahor Relations 
National Labor Relations Board, Federal Labor Relations Authority. 
4. Division ofBenefits Program 
Social Security Administration. 
5. Division ofSecurities, Commodities and Trade Regulation 
Department of Agriculture, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Securi­
ties and Exchange Commission, Federal Trade Commission, International 
Trade Commission. 
6. Division ofLahor 
Department of Labor. 
7. Division of General Programs 
Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Devel­
opment, Food and Drug Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire­
arms, Maritime Commission, U.S. Postal Service, Merit Systems Protection 
Board. 
40. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(c». 
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Corps, would govern the Corps' affairs and operations as a collegial 
council.41 
Administrative law judges are presently examined by the Office 
of Personnel Management (OPM) which certifies the top three can­
didates to individual agencies for appointment to available positions 
as employees of those agencies.42 The bill would preserve the pres­
ent system of merit selection through OPM-administered examina­
tion of candidates.43 It would serve to enlarge the list of eligibles 
from the best three to the best five candidates for each vacancy. This 
would increase opportunities for women and ethnic minority candi­
dates who are less likely to be entitled to veteran's preference.44 Ex­
isting administrative law judges would be transferred to the Corps 
upon the commencement of its operation and each would be as­
signed to a division after consideration of the areas of specialization 
in which the judge had served.4S The judges would be paid uniform 
salaries,46 though slightly higher salaries would be provided for the 
chief judge and the division chiefs. 
Additionally, the bill would screen applicants for the chief 
judge of the Corps and the division chief judge positions by creating 
a five-person Judicial Nomination Commission.47 The Commission 
would determine, for each vacancy, the three best qualified appli­
cants, who had been administrative law judges for at least five years, 
and forward those names to the President for his appointment by 
41. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 565(a». 
42. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3304, 3305 (1982). 
43. See S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. 
§ 567(a». 
44. OPM grades all candidates for administrative law judge positions in accord­
ance with scores obtained in a fuU day written examination, an oral interview by a three 
person panel, and vouchers furnished by lawyers and judges familiar with their abilities 
and qualifying experience. Candidates who served in the armed forces have five points 
added to their scores and disabled veterans and other preference eligibles, married or 
related to disabled veterans, have ten points added under civil service laws. See 5 U.S.c. 
§§ 2108, 3309 (1982). 
45. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Scss. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. 
§§ 562(b), 564(a». 
46. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 567). The pay provisions in the bill are 
couched in technical terms, but when translated provide a salary in the amount many 
senior administrative law judges now receive. 
47. Id.. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 566(a». This commission would be 
appointed by the Chief Judge of the United States Coun of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, the Chief Judge for the United States District Coun for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 
the Chairman of the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association, and 
the President of the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference. Id. (proposing cod­
ification at 5 U.S.C. § 566(b». 
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and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The bill also recog­
nizes the Presidential power to reject any list of names designated for 
anyone position, and to request the Commission to submit 
another.48 
Once its members are appointed,49 the Council would have 
powers similar to those possessed by individual agencies over admin­
istrative law judges.50 The bill, however, provides added responsi­
bilities and duties to the Council.5I Responsibility is also conferred 
upon the Council to make appropriate arrangements for continuing 
judicial education and training. 52 
Inasmuch as the legal specialties that concern agencies may 
change in the future, as will the number of judges needed to hear 
their cases, the Council is authorized to change the number and ju­
risdiction of the divisions. 53 In order to preclude the Council from 
completely converting the judges into "generalists," it may not re­
duce the number of divisions to less than four. On the other hand, to 
prevent a regressive movement toward employment of judges as 
"super-specialists," the Council may not increase the number of divi­
sions to more than ten. 54 
The agencies would continue to have review power over deci­
sions of the judges. 
For two years from the date the Corps begins its operations, 
proceedings would continue to be conducted under the rules of prac­
48. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 566(e)(5». Professor Abraham Dash 
noted this to be a novel methodology for screening judicial applicants, but since the bill 
acknowledges the President's right to reject, it should, in his opinion, withstand chal­
lenges that it unduly limits executive appointment powers contrary to the Constitution. 
See infra note 66. 
49. The bill provides for a five year term for the Chief Judge of the Corps but is 
silent as to the terms of the division chiefs. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1983) 
(proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 563(a». However, the Federal Administrative Law 
Judges Conference proposed that they also serve five year terms that should be staggered 
to avoid undue interruption ofthe workings of the Council. Judge V. Palmer, Chairman 
of the Committee on the Corps of the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference. 
Prepared Statement Presented at the Senate Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. 
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th 
Cong., lst Sess. 29 (June 23, 1983). 
50. Compare S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) wilh Romspeclc, 345 U. S. at 
133-43. 
51. S. 1275, 98th Cong., lst Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. 
§ 565). 
52. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 565(d)(6». 
53. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 564(b». 
54. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 564(a». 
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tice promulgated by each agency.55 After two years, the Council is 
authorized to prescribe uniform procedural rules. At that time, it 
also would report its findings and make recommendations for appro­
priate legislative reforms that would make review of the judges' deci­
sions more efficient and accord greater finality to their decisions. 56 A 
separate study and report is required for each division.57 This 
should cause the Council to take a hard look at the true nature of the 
various forms of administrative decisionmaking. It would require 
the Council to make distinctions between administrative adjudica­
tions where fairness and public satisfaction outweigh the need to ac­
comodate agency efficiency.58 
The Corps would have jurisdiction over all matters presently 
required by the APA to be conducted by an administrative law judge 
in lieu of hearings conducted by the agency or its members. 59 The 
proposed legislation also confers jurisdiction upon the Corps to hear 
any other case referred by federal agencies and courts for determina­
tion on a hearing record.60 
The legislation provides for the removal, suspension, repri­
mand, or disciplining of judges on the basis of incompetence neglect 
of duties, or misconduct.61 Judges may also be removed or sus­
pended for physical or mental disability.62 Under present law, an 
administrative law judge may be removed, suspended, reduced in 
grade or pay, or furloughed for up to 30 days upon a showing of 
good cause by the employing agency in a hearing before the Merit 
Systems Protection Board.63 The language in the bill uses the more 
explicit language employed by Congress to subject bankruptcy 
judges to removal proceedings.64 To assure that complaints against 
55. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 565(d)(7». 
56. Id. § 3. 
57. Id. 
58. In his illuminating work on this subject, Professor Paul R. Verkuil, Dean of 
Tulane University School of Law, recognizes adjudications involving the imposition of 
sanctions as clearly being of this nature. See Verkuil, The Emerging Concept ofAdminis­
trative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 295 (1978). 
59. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 568(a». 
60. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 568(d». 
61. Id. (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. § 569(a)(I». 
62. Id. 
63. 5 U.S.c. § 7521 (1982). 
64. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 153(b) (West Supp. 1983). These provisions were enacted as 
appropriate to judges appointed pursuant to Article I of the Constitution who, unlike 
judges appointed pursuant to Article 3, do not have life tenure. See also Northern Pipe­
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
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the judges are investigated fairly and expeditiously, the bill provides 
for their processing by panels of administrative law judges for a sys­
tem of peer review.6s 
IV. THE SENATE HEARINGS ON SENATE BILL 1275 
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Ad­
ministrative Practice and Procedure, has convened two hearings on 
Senate bill 1275.66 
The Subcommittee heard first from a panel of administrative 
law judges, introduced by Judge Edwin S. Bernstein, President of the 
Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference.67 Judge Bernstein 
emphasized that Senate bill 1275 was supported by each of the three 
organizations which represent administrative law judges: the Fed­
eral Administrative Law Judges Conference,68 the National Confer­
ence of Administrative Law Judges,69 and the Association of 
Administrative Law Judges, Inc.70 
Judge Victor W. Palmer testified at length as Chairman of the 
Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference's Unified Corps 
Committee. He urged the enactment of Senate bill 1275 to redress 
urgent, critical problems adversely affecting Americans. Specifically, 
he called attention to those seeking Social Security benefits, facing 
the loss of licenses to engage in federally regulated businesses, those 
65. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 569(c)-(g». The bill's peer review system is akin to that now applicable to federal dis­
trict court and circuit court judges, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 372(c) (West Supp. 1983). 
This system's prototype has recently been implemented by the United States Department 
of Labor to handle complaints involving its administrative law judges. 
66. The Subcommittee consists of Senator Charles E. Grassley, Chairman (R. 
Iowa), Senator HoweU Heflin, Ranking Minority Member (D. Ala.), Senator Paul Laxah 
(R. Nev.), Senator Arlen Specter (R. Pa.), and Senator Max Baucus, (D. Mont.). The 
hearings were held on June 23 and September 20, 1983. 
See Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S.1l7.5 Before the Subcomm. 
on At/minstrative Practice and Procedure o/Ihe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 117.5). 
67. See id at 4-24. The panel consisted ofJudge Edwin S. Bernstein, Judge Victor 
W. Palmer, Chief Judge Duane R. Harves, and Judge Frank B. Borowiec. 
68. The Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference (F AUC) includes nearly 
800 members and represents judges in each of the twenty-nine federal agencies that hold 
hearings conducted by administrative law judges. Id. at 4. 
69. The National Conference of Administrative Law Judges includes both federal 
and state administrative law judges as its members. It is a constituent of the American 
Bar Association's Judicial Administration Division which, at its 1983 mid-year meeting, 
passed a resolution favoring the establishment of federal administrative law judges as a 
separate, independent and unified corps. Id. 
70. The Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc., represents the nearly 800 
administrative law judges employed at the Social Security Administration. Id. 
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subjected to ever-increasing civil penalties for breach of federal reg­
ulations, and those otherwise dependent upon the fairness and im­
partiality of hearings conducted by federal administrative law 
judges.1 • 
Judge Palmer noted that eight states have transferred their ad­
ministrative law judges to independent central panels to eliminate 
any dependency upon agencies whose programs are directly affected 
by the judges' decisions. At the same time, the federal government 
still assigns its administrative law judges to twenty-nine departments 
and agencies where they are maintained and supported as 
subordinate employees.12 He argued that transfer of federal admin­
istrative law judges to an independent corps where each would be 
assigned to a specialized division in accordance with his or her ex­
pertise, combined the best features of the present system - speciali­
zation and merit selection - with the following four improvements: 
I. Public Perception ofFairness ofHearings 
Assigning judges to a separate, unified corps instead of individual 
departments and agencies would eliminate the present public per­
ception that administrative law judges, particularly those who were 
previously staff members, have an institutional bias in favor of the 
agency. Their separation from the departments and agencies who 
often appear before them as parties would assure actual fairness and 
impartiality, and restore the public's confidence that justice is indeed 
being done. 
2. More Efficient Use ofAdministrative Law Judges 
Under the present system, the management of judges and cases is 
divided among twenty-nine separate departments and agencies pre­
cluding the effective assignment of administrative law judges in ac­
cordance with the varying peaks and valleys in their case loads. 
Establishing the judges as a unified corps would enable this highly 
71. lri. at 30-35. The majority ofadministrative law judges in the federal govern­
ment are no longer assigned to proceedings involving ratemaking, licensing, or the estab­
lishment of agency rules and regulations. lri. at 28-29. As a chart attached to Judge 
Palmer's testimony demonstrated, only 6.8 percent of them are presently so employed. 
This is in marked contrast to the time of the APA's enactment when 63.8 percent were 
assigned to such cases. lri. at 53. Currently, administrative law judges mainly preside 
over adversarial type hearings and disputed claims in which the employing agency is a 
real party-in-interest. The change has raised the level of judicial independence needed 
for the administrative process to be just. lri. at 29-31. 
72. lri. at 26, 31, 40-41. 
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trained expert resource within the federal government to be effi­
ciently employed to dispose of administrative proceedings. 
3. 	 Sign!ficant Cost Savings 
The establishment of a unified corps would allow improved case 
load management thereby reducing personnel requirements. Fur­
thermore, substantial savings would be derived by eliminating the 
replication of hearing facilities and support staffs at the twenty-nine 
departments and agencies. Additional savings and increased pro­
ductivity would be achieved through the use of modem office equip­
ment and computers throughout the corps. 
4. 	 Availability of Administrative Law Judges to Assist Overloaded 
Federal Courts 
The bill expressly authorizes federal courts to refer specialized pro­
ceedings to administrative law judges serving as special masters. 
Under this provision, an existing cadre of administrative law judges 
would be identified as being immediately available to assist the fed­
eral judiciary and provide an inexpensive remedy to the pressing 
problems now facing the federal courts.73 
Judge Duane R. Harves, Chief Hearing Examiner, State of 
Minnesota, Office of Administrative Hearings, next testified in sup­
port of the proposed legislation. He noted that on January 1, 1976, 
Minnesota created a totally independent hearing agency similar to 
the unified corps that Senate bill 1275 would establish. He stated 
that the creation of the centralized Minnesota Office of Hearings had 
dramatically decreased costs of hearings, increased efficiencies, and 
decreased the time in which decisions were issued.74 He testified that 
the division of the office into areas of special expertise had preserved 
specialization and, in every way, the Minnesota experience had been 
73. 	 Id. at 46. 
74. Id. at 8-ll. Judge Harves supplied statistics showing that the cost of hearings 
to the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission was reduced from $311,330 in fiscal year 
1977, the first year his centralized hearings office was in operation, to $ 184,219 for fiscal 
year 1982. The cost of hearings conducted for the Depanment of Commerce feU from 
$ 120,000 to less than $60,000. Id. at 87. Despite inflation and the doubling of the sala­
ries paid to hearing examiners, Minnesota has not had to increase the amounts budgeted 
for his office's operation. Id. Moreover, the total staff was reduced by fony percent, with 
the number of examiners reduced by twenty-seven percent. Id. at 88. The length of time 
for decisions to be issued in workers' compensation cases feU from 101 days following the 
close of the hearing record in December 1981, to fony-six days in May 1983; and, the 
average backlog per examiner likewise decreased from fifteen cases to four cases. Id. at 
89. 
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a resounding success.7S 
The final panel member, Judge Borowiec, testified on behalf of 
the Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc., and its adminis­
trative law judges employed at the Social Security Administration, 
Department of Health and Human Services.76 He reinforced Judge 
Palmer's testimony and described the agency pressures that have 
been brought to bear upon the judges at the Department of Health 
and Human Services.77 In their opinion, he advised, such agency 
pressures squarely conflicted with the traditional American standard 
of justice and the enactment of Senate bill 1275 was essential. 
The next panel included Herbert E. Forrest, Esq., and Professor 
Abraham Dash. Mr. Forrest is a partner in the Washington law firm 
of Steptoe and Johnson and is President of the Federal Communica­
tions Bar Association. Professor Dash is a member of the University 
of Maryland Law School faculty and has written extensively in the 
field of administrative law. Both Mr. Forrest and Professor Dash 
supported the bill. 
Mr. Forrest was critical of the present system under which ad­
ministrative law judges "are housed, sustained, and are ranked as 
(agency) employees. . . . [N]ot only are they seen as having, but 
7S. Id. at 9-10. Although unable to appear in person, Judge Howard H. Kestin, 
Director, State of New Jersey Office of Administrative Law, reported similar dramatic 
benefits under the New Jersey centralized system established in early 1979. Since that 
time, the number of hearing officers has decreased from 130 to forty-five, each of whom 
disposed ofan average of 226 cases in fiscal year 1982. Despite inflation, the average cost 
of processing a case decreased from SS40 in fiscal year 1980 to SS08 in fiscal year 1982. 
Id. at 7S-77. 
76. At present, there are 769 administrative law judges at this agency. 
77. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GoV'T MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE 
COMM. ON GOV'TAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IN THE TITLE 
II SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROORAM, S. REp. No. III, 98th Cong., 1st 
Scss. (1983) [hereinafter cited as THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE). 
Based upon the hearing the Subcommittee conducted on this issue on June 8, 1983, its 
Chairman, Senator William S. Cohen and Ranking Minority Member, Senator Carl 
Levin, reported: 
The Subcommittee's principal finding is that the SSA is pressuring its adminis­
trative law judges to reduce the rate at which they allow disabled persons to 
participate in or continue to participate in the Social Security disability pro­
gram. (The SSA has been successful in its efforts as evidenced by recent statis­
tics showing a dramatic decline in the administrative law judge allowance rate 
in the past year and a half from 67.2 percent in mid-1982, to S1.9 percent in 
June 1983). The Subcommittee also finds that the SSA is imposing this pressure 
through several means including the inequitable and unjustified targeting of 
only allowance decisions and high allowance judges for review pursuant to an 
amendment sponsored by Senator Henry Bellmon and passed in 1980 (Bellmon 
Review), and the usc of minimum production quotas and productivity goals. 
Id. at III. 
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they do in fact have, however unconsciously, a bias toward the 
agency which is often a party to the proceeding, and a partiality to­
ward the view of agency staff."78 On the merits of whether judges 
should be specialists, Mr. Forrest stated: 
[I]t makes all trial and appellate judges the greater for their expe­
rience that they do not sit with the narrow tunnel vision of special­
ization, but are exposed, not only to new ideas, and new 
situations, but also to different views and perceptions of old issues, 
for example, how different agencies look at ratemaking to derive a 
more comprehensive, balanced and creative decision. It may not 
be something that can be demonstrated empirically, but I believe 
it's there.79 
Professor Dash stated that the concept of a unified corps of ad­
ministrative law judges had been one that was proposed as far back 
as 1946 when the Administrative Procedure Act came into being, 
and the essential question was not whether a unified corps of federal 
administrative law judges should be enacted, but, why it still had not 
been enacted.80 
The final witness at the initial hearing was Loren A. Smith, 
Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States. Chair­
man Smith listed the chief benefits of Senate bill 1275 as increased 
efficiency, cost savings, greater public confidence in the impartiality 
and independence of administrative law judges, and diversification 
of the judges' experience. He further observed that it would allow an 
objective, credible system to be designed for evaluating the judges' 
performance, and could lead to a more unified, coherent approach 
by Congress to agency adjudication. As for the bill's negative impli­
cations, he cited reduced expertise, the creation of a new bureau­
cracy, unforeseen interference with the ultimate decisional 
responsibility of individual agencies, and the need to devise an equi­
table system for allocating the judges to the agencies. The latter 
could be allocated by pro rata sharing of adjudicative costs, to pre­
vent drawing too liberally upon the judges' services when not actu­
ally needed. On balance, he favored the corps concept embodied in 
the bill on efficiency grounds, and suggested that an experimental 
model might be created first for a four year trial period, to include 
only those judges in the fifteen smallest agencies.81 
78. Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 66, at 97. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 98. 

8!. Id. at \08-12. The Administrative Conference consists of ninety-one members 
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At the second hearing on September 20, 1983, Mr. Geoffrey S. 
Stewart and Mr. Joseph A. Morris testified for the Department of 
Justice and the Office of Personnel Management.82 
Mr. Stewart offered the view of the Department of Justice that a 
change of such magnitude in the national administrative judiciary 
called for thorough reflection and detailed empirical study. In the 
Department's opinion, administrative law judges presently had suffi­
cient protections to assure their independence.83 He also expressed 
concern that the proposal would create a "generalist corps" of ad­
ministrative law judges, and would "unnecessarily impede the im­
plementation of agency policies."84 Finally, he presented objections 
to several details of the bill. He took issue with the creation of a 
collegially functioning Council consisting of the Corps' chief judge 
and division chiefs as a means ofgoverning the Corps' operation and 
appointment of new administrative law judges; the creation of a 
Complaints Resolution Board to discipline judges under a system of 
peer review; and the creation of a Judicial Nomination Commission 
to recommend qualified administrative law judges for presidential 
appointments as members of the Council. 
Mr. Morris argued that the legislation would dilute the agency 
program expertise of administrative law judges and agencies would 
not be able to rely upon timely processing of hearing requests. He 
emphasized that there was a need for "agency administrative control 
over [administrative law judges)."8s Additionally, he objected to the 
bill's salary provisions. 
Althea T. Simmons, Director of the Washington Bureau of Na­
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People ques­
tioned whether the bill would promote the independence of 
administrative law judges or increase their efficiency. In her opin­
ion, the Administrative Procedure Act amply insulated administra­
and twenty-two liaison representatives. It includes representatives of federal depart­
ments and agencies, the private bar, law schools, and professional associations. One of 
the authors serves as a liaison representative to the Administrative Conference as Presi­
dent of the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference. 
82. Mr. Stewart is Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy at 
Department of Justice. Id. at 125. Mr. Morris is General Counsel at Office of Personnel 
Management. Id. at 137. 
83. Id. at 126. Jonathan C. Rose, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Pol­
icy, clarified that the testimony given on behalf of the Department of Justice "does not 
reflect any disagreement with the laudable objectives of the bill's proponents ...." 
Letter from Jonathan C. Rose to Victor W. Palmer (Dec. 13, 1983). 
84. Hearmgs on S. 1275, supra note 66, at 126, 127. 
85. Id. at 141. 
.' 
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tive law judges from inappropriate agency control. She 
acknowledged, however, that with respect to the Social Security 
judges, "the intrusion of that agency upon the decisional indepen­
dence of the administrative law judges appears highly inappropri­
ate."86 The more desirable legislative cure for that problem, in her 
opinion, was to establish an independent Health and Human Serv­
ices Review Commission to which all Social Security judges should 
be transferred. She was also skeptical as to the advantages of judi­
cial "generalists" over "specialists" and expressed concern regarding 
the potential for politicization of a unified corps of administrative 
law judges.87 
Next, John T. Miller, Jr., an attorney with many years of experi­
ence in administrative law, testified in support of the Bill.88 Mr. 
Miller declared that an administrative law judge corps would assure 
uniform work loads, thereby enabling better use of administrative 
law judge time. At present, he continued, each agency and depart­
ment determines whether funds will be provided for the continuing 
legal education of their administrative law judges. "At a time when 
the judiciary throughout the nation has come to recognize the value 
of such education in terms of more effective and efficient administra­
tion of justice, there is an obvious deficiency in the opportunities in 
the funding of continuing education for federal [administrative law 
judges]."89 He expressed confidence that a unified corps would bet­
ter attend to the need for continuing education and training of ad­
ministrative law judges. Mr. Miller added that emphasis on 
expertise is often a misplaced value, stressing the example of federal 
courts where specific expertise has not been a necessary qualification 
of judges who review agency decisions. 
Acting on behalf of an ad hoc committee of fifteen federal ad­
ministrative law judges who favored continuation of the status quo, 
Judge Joseph B. Kennedy testified that the current process provided 
for sufficient independence of federal administrative law judges.90 
He contended that the situation at Social Security was the only 
known circumstance in which administrative law judges had been 
subjected to an inappropriate degree of agency control. He sug­
gested that the establishment of an independent review commission 
to house Social Security judges would be a more appropriate re­
86. Id. at 165. 
87. Id. at 165-67. 
88. Id. at 152. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 156. 
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sponse to that problem. He disagreed that the bill would result in 
substantial savings; rather the proposal would "interfere with the 
agency's ability to perform the functions for which they were cre­
ated."91 In his opinion, although the bill purported to create special­
ized divisions, the existence of those divisions would be temporary 
and readily altered by vote of the Council of the Corps. He con­
cluded that the proposal would create an unwieldy bureaucracy re­
quiring additional employees. 
The next witness was Robert H. Joost who testified as a private 
citizen supporting the creation of a unified corps of administrative 
law judges. He remarked that an administrative law judge's federal 
agency employer almost always appeared before the judge as a liti­
gant and that this necessarily created the appearance of unfairness. 
Similarly, appropriate agency disciplining of a judge was difficult be­
cause it might appear to have improperly affected his or her judicial 
independence. Mr. Joost then submitted wide-ranging recommen­
dations he believed would improve the bill: transferring responsibil­
ity for examining future applicants from OPM to the Corps; 
expanding the types of legal experience which would qualify appli­
cants; further dividing the divisions of the Corps into more special­
ized subdivisions or panels; and, creating a class of GS 13/14 
"Administrative Examiners" to hear less important cases thereby 
creating a career ladder for administrative law judges.92 
The final witness, Professor Victor G. Rosenblum testified that 
in his 1975 study for the Administrative Conference of the United 
States, he recommended that the time was not yet right for the crea­
tion of an administrative law judge corps. As a witness in 1983, 
however, he stated: "I'm convinced that now is the hour for such a 
COrpS."93 He then reviewed his rationale in 1975 and explained how 
three of the four factors which accounted for his position at that time 
had significantly changed between 1975 and 1983.The factor he 
found unchanged was proof that the operation of the administrative 
law judge program would not be impaired by political corruption or 
./ 
91. Id at 184. 
92. Id. at 191-93. Mr. Joost is a former member of the professional staff of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and at present is a hearing officer for the Commodity Fu­
tures Trading Commission. 
93. Id. at 194. Professor Rosenblum has been a professor of law at Northwestern 
University since 1958, is a past chairman of the Administrative Law Section of the Amer­
ican Bar Association, and is the current vice-president of the American Judicature Soci­
ety. His article entitled Contexl.l and Contents of "Fo, Good Cause" As Criterion fo, 
Removal ofAdminist,ative Law Judges: Legal and Policy Facto,s also appears in this 
symposium. 
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other improper infiuences.94 
One factor which had changed was the failure of a compromise 
made between the Administrative Conference and the Civil Service 
Commission in 1962. Under that compromise the Administrative 
Conference had refrained from recommending removal of the hear­
ing examiner program from the Commission on the basis of its 
promise to institute improvements responsive to a detailed critique 
of the Commission's operation of the program by Professor Wilbur 
Lester, then staff director of the Administrative Conference's Com­
mittee on Personne1.9S Professor Rosenblum stated that the Com­
mission's promise was not kept: 
The period of constructive implementation of the Conference"s 
1962 recommendation which was exemplified by such promising 
steps as utilization of a comprehensive written examination, in­
volvment of renowned practitioners and members of the academic 
community in the oral phase of the examination, addition of trial 
experience as one basis for qualification for appointment, and es­
tablishment of the La Macchia Committee to study multiple 
dimensions of the status and utilization of administrative law 
judges, has long since lapsed into limbo. 
The change in agency title in 1979 from Civil Service Com­
mission to Office of Personnel Management and the division of 
functions between OPM and the Merit Systems Protection Board 
wrought no concomitant renewal of reformist energy or zeal. . . . 
General Accounting Office studies of management of the ad­
ministrative law process offer no reason to believe that [OPM] has 
made a salient priority of the implementation or evaluation of 
proposals for improving roles, functions and performance of [ad­
ministrative law judges]. On the contrary, GAO has been overtly 
critical of management of the administrative law process.96 
Another factor which had changed was the development of em­
pirical data substantiating the achievement of major benefits through 
implementation of central panel systems in seven states. The new 
evidence, he found, demonstrated "clearly that the corps concept is 
practicable and feasible."97 
94. Id 
95. Id. at 194-95; see W. LESTER, REPORT ON SECTION II HEARING EXAMINERS TO 
THE COMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 28 (1962). 
96. Hearings on S. 1275, supra note 66, at 195-96. 
97. Id. at 196-97. The seven States are California. Colorado, Florida, Massachu­
setts, Minnesota, New Jersey and Tennessee. See generally M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, THE 
CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN 
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Professor Rosenblum concluded that the Civil Service Commis­
sion and its successor, the Office of Personnel Management, had 
failed to follow through on the LaMacchia Committee recommenda­
tions98 and failed to develop an effective administrative law judge 
program: a "fresh start through the corps concept is warranted, 
promising and practicable in Senate bill 1275."99 
V. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ENACTMENT 
Persuasive arguments for the establishment of federal adminis­
trative law judges as an independent, unified corps through enact­
ment of Senate bill 1275 have been advanced by the practicing 
bar,lOo eminent professors of law,101 and the administrative law 
judges.102 
Opponents, however, argue that with the exception of the Social 
Security Administration (SSA), there is no evidence of agency inter­
ference with the judicial functions of administrative law judges. 
They suggest that the more appropriate legislative response would be 
to vest jurisdiction over social security cases in a new, independent 
review commission to which administrative law judges now em­
ployed by SSA would be transferred. Additionally, opponents have 
articulated fears that enactment of the bill will lead to politicization 
of the administrative law judge system, a reduction of agency effi­
ciency through agency loss of control of their dockets, the replace­
ment of "specialists" by "generalists," and the creation of an even 
more expensive, unwieldy bureaucracy.103 
The strength of the arguments favoring the Corps' establish­
ment perhaps are measured best in the context of these doubts and 
fears. 
A. 	 Interference With Judicial Functions ofAdministrative Law 
Judges by Agency Employers 
Witnesses who testified in support of the Heflin bill did not un-
STATES (1983). The State of Washington, on July I, 1982, became the eighth State to 
employ a central panel system. 
98. Hearings on S. 117.5, supra note 66, at 197-98. See supra note 37 and accompa­
nying text. This study was conducted by a panel of administrative law judges chaired by 
the Civil Service Commission's then Deputy Counsel. 
99. Hearings on S. 117.5, supra note 66, at 198. 
100. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 88-89. 
101. 	 See supra text accompanying note 92-99. 
102. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 67-77. 
103. 	 See supra text accompanying notes 82-87. 
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dertake a comprehensive survey of practices at every federal depart­
ment and agency which interfere with the judicial functions of 
administrative law judges in their employ. The focus on agency in­
terference and pressuring was restricted to the practices at the SSA, 
the current subject of extensive media coverage lO4 and a congres­
sional oversight hearing which resulted in the issuance of a severely 
critical report. lOS 
The report documented SSA's pressuring of its administrative 
law judges to decide against claims by the disabled. I06 It charged 
that pressure was exerted through the use of minimum production 
quotas, targeting decisions by high allowance judges for agency re­
view, improperly using internal guidelines to bind its judges, and 
prohibiting them from following selected court precedents. 107 A 
New York Times editorial108 also charged that these practices by the 
SSA were in response to a decision by the administration to elimi­
nate fraudulent claims and reduce the $18 billion year expended to 
pay 4 million workers and their dependents. SSA's responsiveness to 
the administration's policies caused it to use its position as the em­
ployer of administrative law judges to interfere with their judicial 
functions. 109 
Every federal agency where administrative law judges are em­
ployed is motivated to be responsive to its administration's policies. 
It is more difficult, however, to document equivalent pressuring by 
other agencies. Because SSA employs 769 administrative law 
judges110 in approximately 100 offices, it necessarily communicates 
its policy in writing. Other agencies, that have a smaller cadre of 
judges located in a single office, communicate orally. Even so, in­
stances of interference with the judicial functions of administrative 
law judges by other agencies have surfaced. I I I 
In 1976, the Undersecretary of the Interior disagreed with a de­
104. See, e.g., Give Ine Disahled a Grand/alner, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1983, at A30, 
col. I.; Public Broadcasting Station Documentary, Who Decides Disability? (June 20, 
1983) (Transcript available through WGBH-TV, 125 Western Avenue, Boston MA 
02134). 
105. See supra note 77. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Give tile Disahled a Grand/alher, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1983, at A30, col. I. 
109. Id. 
110. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, TOTAL NUMBER OF AUs ON BOARD 
BY GRADE AND AGENCY AS OF Nov. 21, 1983 (1984). 
III. 43 Op. All'y Gen. I (1977). 
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cision by an administrative law judge at that agency.ll2 Instead of 
simply reversing the decision, as was the agency's right, the Under­
secretary placed an official reprimand in the judge's personnel file, 
placing the judge's qualifications under a cloud and hindering his 
opportunities for future promotion or new employment. The repri­
mand was later expunged pursuant to an opinion by the Attorney 
General, but only after the expenditure of considerable legal fees 
which the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference helped to 
defray. In finding that the reprimand confiicted with the APA, the 
Attorney General nonetheless recognized the right of an agency to 
reprimand its judges as well as its right "to assign or withhold park­
ing spaces, . . . establish working hours, [and) assign secretarial 
assistance." 113 
Administrative law judges at every federal agency are vulnera­
ble to such discipline. The fact that wrongful actions may eventually 
be reversed after. costly litigation provides little comfort. 
Although the APA requires administrative law judges to be as­
signed to cases in rotation, 114 the Supreme Court in Ramspeck inter­
preted the modifying words "so far as practicable" to allow 
assignments on the basis of "the experience and ability of the exam­
iner available."11!1 This interpretation has permitted questionable 
agency practices in making case assignments. PATCO v. Federal La­
bor Relations Authority ,I 16 contains a disturbing finding respecting 
the assignment of the Air Controller's strike case: "On August 4, 
1981 [Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) members) ... met 
with [FLRA's Chief Administrative Law Judge). . . at lunch to dis­
cuss the procedural aspects of the PA TCO case. During that discus­
sion, it was suggested that [the Chief Judge) ... appoint a capable 
judge, preferably himself, to hear the PATCO case...."117 
FLRA's Chief Judge complied and assigned the case to himself. 
On September 5, 1980, in a hearing before the Consumer Sub­
committee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, FTC's Chief Judge testified that all eleven of the 
FTC's administrative law judges, at one time or another, served as 
staff attorneys at the Commission. ll. s He further confirmed that in 
112. la. 
1l3. la. 
114. 5. U.S.C. § 3105 (1982). 
115. 345 U.S. at 139-40. 
116. 685 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
117. la. at 619. 
118. Administrative Law Juage System: Hearings Before tlte Suhcomm. for Consum­
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August 1978, the FTC judge assigned to a case involving the Kellogg 
Company 1 19 advised the agency of his plans to retire. The FTC re­
tained him on the case through a special contract which gave him 
both his pension and salary while he served "at the will of the ap­
pointing officer."12o Kellogg, upon being informed of the arrange­
ment, vigorously objected and the judge was replaced. 121 
Agency rules of practice are typically prepared by their general 
counsel. This can result in rules that favor the agency over the other 
parties who may appear before its administrative law judges.l22 The 
Heflin bill's provisions for the establishment of uniform rules of 
practice by the Corps, led one agency official to make this enlighten­
ing protest: 
§ 565( d)(7) authorizes the policymaking body of the Corps to 
"prescribe the rules of practice and procedure for the conduct of 
proceedings before the Corps." As Oliver Wendell Holmes once 
said, "substantive law is secreted in the interstices of procedure." 
The effect of § 565(d)(7) will be to surrender, in subtle ways, part 
of the Agency's substantive rule making authority to the Corps. 123 
The NLRB's rules of practice were before the Supreme Court in 
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. 124 which upheld the board's 
right to bar prehearing discovery. However, this one-sided aspect of 
its rules of practice evoked the following comment from Justice 
Powell: 
I do not read the Act to authorize agencies to adopt or adhere to 
nonstatutory rules barring all prehearing disclosure of investiga­
tory records. The Court reasons, . . . that such disclosure ­
which is deemed "premature" only because it is in advance of the 
time of release set by the agency - will enable "suspected viola­
tors" . . . to learn the Board's case in advance and frustrate the 
ers ofthe Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
117 (1980) (Statement of Ernest Barnes, C.A.L.J., F.T.C.) [hereinafter cited as 1980 
Hearings). 
119. Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982). 
120. 1980 Hearings, supra note 118, at 117. 
121. /d. 
122. The Depanment of Agriculture's rules of practice, for example, prohibit its 
administrative law judges from dismissing on the pleadings, any of the complaints De­
panment lawyers file in enforcement proceedings. 7 C.F.R. § 1.143(b) (1983). Con­
versely, in proceedings where Agriculture defends petitions seeking relief, the judges are 
directed to entenain its motions to dismiss petitions for being defective in form. Id. 
§ 9OO.S2(c). 
123. Environmental Protection Agency Memorandum from Ronald L. McCaUum, 
Judicial Officer, to Virginia Gibbons, Office of Legislation (July 14, 1983). 
124. 437 U.S. 214 (1978). 
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proceedings or construct defenses which would permit violations 
to go unremedied. . . . This assumption is not only inconsistent 
with the congressional judgment expressed in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure that "trial by ambush"... may well disserve the 
cause of truth, but it also threatens to undermine the Act's overall 
presumption of disclosure, at least during the pendancy of en­
forcement proceedings. 12S 
The Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Man­
agement described SSA's refusal to accord precedential weight to se­
lected court decisions as a policy of "non-acquiescence."'26 This 
policy of non-acquiescence is not limited to SSA.127 The right of 
agencies to engage in these policies involves complex and difficult 
constitutional questions. 128 Enactment of Senate bill 1275 would not 
in itself resolve the constitutional problems, but its provisions do call 
for a study, division by division, examining the ways in which agen­
cies review decisions by administrative law judges. This kind of re­
view undertaken by the Corps' Council would indeed be an 
important first step. 
Even if no constitutional issues existed, when an agency directs 
its administrative law judges to ignore otherwise binding court 
precedents, the judges are being asked to give priority to their duties 
as employees over their judicial responsibility. 129 
125. Id. at 253 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted). 
126. See supra note 77. 
127. The Subcommittee indicated that SSA argued "its policy was no different 
than that of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)." THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGE, supra note 77, at 27. 
128. The subcommittee report referred to three principal constitutional issues: (1) 
the doctrine of separation of powers; (2) the doctrine of slare decisis; and (3) the due 
process rights of litigants. Id. at 28-29. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803); Yellow Taxi Co. of Minn. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Frock v. 
United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 685 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1982), cerl denied, 103 S. Ct. 
1185 (1982); S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. OSHRC, 659 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Marshall, 636 F.2d 32, 33 (3d Cir. 1980); ITT World 
Communications v. FCC, 635 F.2d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 1980); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 
F.2d 224,228-29 (2d Cir.), uri. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980); Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. 
v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 458,864 (7th Cir. 1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 
965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Siedlecki v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 43, 46-48 (W.D. 
Wash. 1983); Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1364-65 (D. Ariz. 1983); Hillhouse v. 
Harris, 547 F. Supp. 88,93 (W.D. Ark. 1982), affd, 715 F.2d 428 (1983). 
129. The Senate Subcommittee stated the problem as follows: 
The (administrative law judges] are also detrimentally affected by the SSA's 
policy of non-acquiescence. The (administrative law judges) predicament was 
described in Hillhouse v. Harris, when the court indicated that the [administra­
tive law judges) are caught in the most unenviable position of "trying to serve 
two masters; the courts and the Secretary of Health and Human Services." 
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The problem caused by agency refusals 130 to accede to court de­
cisions interpretory of the laws agencies administer was stated by 
Professor Jaffe: 
The scope of judicial review is ultimately conditioned and deter­
mined by the major proposition that the constitutional courts of 
this country are the acknowledged architects and guarantors of the 
integrity of the legal system. . . . An agency is not an island en­
tire of itself. . . . The very subordination of the agency to judi­
cial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the premise that each 
agency is to be brought into harmony with the totality of the 
law;...131 
B. Po/ilicizalion 
Those who would maintain the status quo argue that the Corps' 
establishment must ultimately lead to destruction of the present sys­
tem for merit appointment of federal administrative law judges. 
They fear that as administrative law judges stand separate and apart 
from agencies, and have heightened visibility, there will be a con­
comitant increase in pressures to discard the merit selection system. 
They view the bill's provisions for Presidential appointment of the 
chief judge and division chiefs as a template which will eventually 
apply to all administrative law judge appointments. 132 
The fear is unfounded. The bill does not alter the present sys-
Moreover, this situation is demoralizing to the [administrative law judges) who 
know that their judicial efforts may be meaningless. If they adhere to the SSA's 
non-acquiescence ruling, their decisions may be overturned in Federal court 
because they failed to follow prededent; and if they adhere to the courts' deci­
sions, their decisions may be overturned by the SSA through the Appeals Coun­
cil. To say the least, this practice creates a professional and judicial quandary 
for the [administrative law judge)." 
THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, supra note 77, at 30. 
130. In Yellow Taxi Company of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 
1983), the court stated: "No court can overlook an agency's defiant refusal to follow well 
established law .... Some members of the Board have historically arrogated to them­
selves the authority to 'disagree' with judicial precedent." Id. at 382. In justifying its 
refusal to give precedential weight to a decision by a United States circuit court, another 
agency explained the decision was the result of "judicial illiteracy," or the court "was so 
busy that it brushed the case aside in order to avoid the onerous chore of giving full 
consideration to the case," or was an attempt to avoid "summary reversal by the 
Supreme Court" through "disguise" of the court's real motive. In re Shatkin, 34 Agric. 
Dec. 296, 307-\3 (1979) (discussing Economou v. USDA, 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1974». 
131. Butt v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 190-91 (1973) (Stewart, 
J., dissenting) (quoting L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 589­
90 (1965». 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87 & 90-91. 
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tem of merit selection of administrative law judges. 133 Nor is there 
any reason to believe that its passage will lead to modification of this 
system. 
The bill requires council members to be selected from adminis­
trative law judges who possess five years prior experience. Screening 
of applicants would be administered by a panel selected by two fed­
eral judges, the Chairman of ACUS, and leading members of the bar 
and the administrative law judge community.134 These require­
ments, taken together, make it unlikely that the positions will go to 
those whose only qualification is loyalty to the political party in 
power. Moreover, provisions in the bill for processing complaints of 
incompetence or misconduct are equally applicable to council mem­
bers and may be instituted by anyone, including administrative law 
judges who believe their functions have been improperly influenced 
by council members. us 
It has also been suggested that placing administrative law 
judges under the control of politically appointed division chiefs and 
the chief judge, will lead to politicization of the Corps, but such a 
system would be far less enmeshed in politics than the present one 
which subordinates the judges to political appointees. Currently 
agency heads are committed to the policies of the administration in 
office, whereas the chief judge and division chiefs of an independent 
Corps would have no such commitments. 
C. 	 Reduced EffiCiency When Agencies Lose Control of Their 
Dockets and "Generalists" Replace "Specialists" 
Critics of the bill insist that because a unified corps will not be 
as responsive to agency needs and priorities, case backlogs must re­
sult unless agencies retain control over the dockets. 136 As with any 
other government agency, however, the Corps will be answerable to 
the President and the Congress for budgeted funds and must be re­
sponsive to such criticisms. Virtually every tribunal has procedures 
for according time priorities to matters requiring expedited treat­
ment. 137 Similar procedures could be mandated for the Corps. 
133. 	 See S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 
U.S.C. § 567(a». 
134. 	 See kI. § 4. 
135. 	 See kI. § 2 (proposing codification at 5 U.S.c. § 569). 
136. See Hearings on S. J]7J, supra note 66, at 133-35 (statement of Geoffrey S. 
Stewart, Deputy Assistant AU'y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, Dep't of Justice); id. at 294­
95 (statement of C.M. Butler III, Chairman, FERC). 
137. 	 Rule 12 of Uniform Rules of Procedure for Boards of Contract Appeals under 
700 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW (Vol. 6:673 
When the Comptroller General studied the administrative law pro­
cess, he concluded that the delays that have plagued it are not attrib­
utable to administrative law judges. There are two major causes for 
delays in the administrative process - extensive agency review of 
administrative law judges' decisions and the use of more complex 
judicial procedures than necessary to resolve some disputes."138 The 
positive aspect of reduction in agency control over dockets is that 
opportunities to manipulate or predict case assignments would end. 
Agency officials have also voiced concern that program exper­
tise may be lost through the Corps' establishment. The bill, how­
ever, recognizes the importance of specialized expertise and provides 
for its continuance. The Corps would initially consist of seven divi­
sions which the Council could expand to ten. The Council could 
also. achieve ,more intensive specialization within the divisions 
through regulations establishing special panels or sections. 
The Corps' divisions have been structured in accordance with 
major specialties of administrative law. Judges presently employed 
by federal agencies would be assigned to divisions on the basis of 
their existing legal ~xpertise. The powers conferred upon the Corps' 
Council permit it to require new judges or judges seeking transfers to 
participate in appropriate training programs prior to assignment to a 
division.139 Optimally, a division chief would assign complex cases 
from an agency to judges who previously served there or otherwise 
have proven expertise in that area. As each judge acquired experi­
ence in new fields of expertise, all would eventually be qualified to 
hear any case assigned to the division. 
Many knowledgeable educators, practitioners and members of 
the judiciary unequivocally state that the importance of specializa­
tion is overemphasized. Those who advocate to the contrary, exag­
gerate the time it would take to learn various specialties of 
administrative law. l40 As John T. Miller, a private practitioner of 
the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, promulgated by Office of Management and Budget 
for all federal boards of contract appeals, establishes both expedited procedures for small 
claims and accelerated procedures for various other cases. 10 C.F.R. § 1023.20 (1983). 
138. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW PROCESS: BETTER MANAGEMENT Is NEEDED, FPCD078·25, Cover Sheet (May 15, 
1978). See a/so COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, MANAGEMENT 
IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS: MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE, 
FPCD-79-44 (May 27, 1979) (follow-up report). 
139. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983) (proposing codification at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 561). 
140. One of the authors of this article serves the Department of Agriculture which 
administers no less than fifty separate statutes. Each time the responsibility for a statute 
701 1984) ESTABLISHING AN INDEPENDENT CORPS 
law who testified at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing as­
serted: "It has not been in the Anglo-American tradition to appoint 
lawyers as judges on the basis of a narrow, and, perhaps, temporary 
expertise. . . . No lawyer should be appointed an [Administrative 
Law Judge] who lacks the energy, intellect and discipline to acquire 
needed expertise." 141 
D. 	 The Corps Will Not Be a More Expensive, Unwieldy 
Bureaucracy 
There is a current perception that an agency, once created, rap­
idly expands its staff and budget to become a self-perpetuating em­
pire. This is the ratio decidendi of the new sunset laws designed to 
cause agencies to self-destruct unless they can affirmatively demon­
strate their ongoing usefulness. Those who oppose the establishment 
of administrative law judges as an independent, unified corps, pro­
ject a similar self-aggrandizing scenario. 
But the work of the Corps will never be of its own making. 
Every adjudicative function Congress entrusts to the Executive 
Branch creates a correlative need for fair and impartial arbiters. The 
proposed legislation merely assembles, under one supervisory au­
thority, those who hear APA-type proceedings. The work will be 
there whether or not the Corps is established. The costs of con­
ducting proceedings with a corps in place should be less than under 
the present system. 
There is no practical method at present for assigning judges to 
proceedings in a meaningful relationship to the actual case loads at 
each agency. Offsetting peaks and valleys in agency needs for hear­
ings by administrative law judges are not now adjusted. 
The OPM administered loan program has not solved this prob­
or program has been added or taken away, the variety of cases heard by the department's 
judges changes. The administrative law judges at the Department of Labor also hear and 
decide an equivalently large variety of cases under diverse statutes and regulations. Typ­
ical of a number of administrative law judges who have been able to quickly adapt to 
differing areas of expertise during the course of their judicial careers, the other author of 
this article has specialized as a member of a board of contract appeals in government 
procurement law and as an administrative law judge at several agenCies where he has 
decided labor-management, workers' compensation, child-labor, and other cases for the 
Department of Labor; civil penalty cases for the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 
Commission; false advertising cases for the Postal Service; and debarment cases for the 
Small Business Administration (SBA). The SBA debarment cases were heard pursuant 
to a loan program administered by the Office of Personnel Management, under which 
many judges have quickly and successfully adapted to cases of administrative law com­
pletely disparate from those they normally hear and decide. 
141. 	 Heari"gs 0" S. 1275, supra note 66, at 173. 
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lem. Although an excellent theoretical solution, it conflicts with 
pragmatic agency concerns. The same reason given by many agen­
cies in opposition to the Corps' establishment - lack of agency con­
trol- often persuades agencies to assign non-APA protected in-house 
employees to hearings, where possible, rather than borrowing un­
known administrative law judges. More importantly, lending agen­
cies must concede that their judges are underworked, which could 
imply that they have too many judges, prosecuting attorneys and 
other personnel, and could result in reductions in appropriated funds 
and staff. 
The establishment of a corps should not increase any of the ma­
jor costs of maintaining administrative law judges. These costs con­
sist of payroll, physical facilities and travel. The Corps' anticipated 
consolidation of functions and elimination of duplication should de­
crease each of these cost components. Merely because the Corps will 
be a new agency does not mean there will be additional costs. At 
present, administrative law judges frequently make arrangements 
through the General Services Administration for the use of hearing 
room facilities. 142 There would be no change in this practice. The 
vast majority of administrative law judges are presently located 
throughout the nation in GSA owned or leased buildings. There 
would be no reason to move those judges. 
The eventual consolidation of administrative law judges located 
in Washington will decrease costs by reducing the number of square 
feet required for hearing rooms, libraries, etc. The bill provides for 
the transfer of support personnel from agencies that now employ ad­
ministrative law judges. Therefore, the establishment of a corps will 
not result in the hiring of additional personnel. The employment of 
modem computers and other equipment by the Corps should even­
tually reduce the size of its staff. 
These anticipated cost savings have been experienced in states 
which have implemented similar centralized systems of administra­
tive adjudication. 143 Furthermore, as public confidence in the ad­
ministrative judiciary is increased, appeals to federal courts should 
142. Each United States district court maintains little used courtrooms in cities 
where it infrequently sits. The United States Tax Court has hearing rooms in most major 
cities that are frequently idle and available. State and local governments are also gener­
aUy cooperative. In addition, a special law school training program, participated in by 
both authors, has been recently developed by the ABA's National Conference of Admin­
istrative Law Judges in which agency hearings are conducted before students in law 
schools' moot court facilities, after which the presiding administrative law judge lectures 
on the practical aspects of administrative law. 
143. See supra notes 74, 7S & 96. 
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decrease with resulting cost savings to both the executive and the 
judicial branches of the federal government. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Enactment of the Heflin bill would rectify a fundamental con­
tlict between requisites of the Constitution and the present system for 
employment of federal administrative law judges. 
They are presently housed as subordinate employees of agencies 
which may be motivated to interfere with judicial functions. The 
most striking example of actual interference is provided by the So­
cial Security Administration. These practices condict with the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution;l44 
It is no answer to these arguments that the agency interferences 
were in pursuit of honorable ends which the agency sought to imple­
ment in the most efficient manner. "Indeed, one might fairly say of 
the Bill of Rights in general and the Due Process Clause in particu­
lar, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnera­
ble citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy 
which may characterize praiseworthy government officials." 145 
Eight states have now recognized that the role of the adminis­
trative judiciary is inconsistent with their employment by individual 
regulatory agencies and departments of the executive branch. 146 The 
use of central panel systems by those states have proven successful 
.and saved money. There is every reason to believe that the federal 
government would enjoy similar cost savings by establishing its ad­
ministrative law judges as an independent, unified corps. 
Bernard G. Segal, past president of the American Bar Associa­
tion, perhaps best explained the essential reason why an independent 
administrative judiciary is needed: 
Consider, for example, the unavoidable appearance of bias when 
144. A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness, 
of course, requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. Our system of law has 
always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. The Supreme Court has 
said that "[e)very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man 
as a judge. . .not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the 
accused, denies the latter due process oflaw." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). 
Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who, having no actual bias, 
attempt to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. In order to 
perform its high function in the best way '~ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice." 
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. II, 14 (1954); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955). 
145. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
146. See supra note 97. 
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an administrative law judge, attached to an agency, is presiding in 
litigation by that agency against a private party. One can fill the 
pages of the United States Code with legislation intended to guar­
antee the independence of the administrative law judge; but so 
long as that judge has offices in the same building as the agency 
staff, so long as the seal of the agency adorns the bench on which 
that judge sits, so long as that judge's assignment to the case is by 
the very agency whose actions or contentions that judge is being 
called on to review, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for 
that judge to convey the image of being an impartial fact finder. 
A truly competent and impartial administrative judiciary is a 
precious prize indeed. But even more than a prize, such an ad­
ministrative judiciary is essential if our administrative justice sys­
tem is to function successfully under the crushing weight of new 
legislation and new cases and in the fishbowl environment in 
which all of government finds itself as we embark upon our third 
century as a nation. 141 
The authors join with Mr. Segal and the many other distin­
guished members of the bar who favor the corps concept. We be­
lieve that enactment of the Hedin bill will assure the fairness of 
administrative adjudications and result in more efficient employ­
ment of administrative law judges with consequental cost savings to 
the federal government. 
147. Segal, The Administrative Lo.,., Judge, 62 A.B.A. J. 1424, 1426, 1428 (1976). 
